00100	.SEC A SYMBOL-PROCESSING THEORY OF THE PARANOID MODE
00200	
00300	           
00400	.SS Generalizations
00500	
00600		A  theory  involves a conjunction of lawlike generalizations,
00700	hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions.  The  theory  to  be  described
00800	postulates  a  structure  or  organization  of  interacting  symbolic
00900	procedures. These procedures and their interactions are  supplemented
01000	in   the   theory   by   a   number   of  auxiliary  assumptions  and
01100	presuppositions which will become apparent as the story unfolds.
01200	
01300	
01400		I  shall first presuppose a schema of intentionalistic action
01500	and non-action which takes the form of a practical inference:
01600		AN AGENT A WANTS SITUATION S TO OBTAIN
01700		A BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER FOR S TO OBTAIN, A MUST DO X
01800		THEREFORE A PLANS, TRIES OR PROCEEDS TO DO X
01900	.END
02000	An  agent  is  taken here to be any intentionalistic system, person ,
02100	procedure or strategy.  To do means  to  produce,  prevent  or  allow
02200	something  to  happen. We presuppose the agent's power to do X. X can
02300	be multiple sequential or  concurrent  actions  and  includes  mental
02400	action  (e.g.   deciding) as well as physical action(e.g.talking). It
02500	is also presupposed in this  action-schema  that  ,  in  doing  X,  A
02600	receives  feedback  as  to whether S is coming about, i.e.    whether
02700	doing X is successful or not in obtaining S.
02800	
02900		It  is  established  clinical knowledge that the phenomena of
03000	the paranoid mode can be found associated with a variety of  physical
03100	disorders.   For  example, paranoid thinking can be found in patients
03200	with   head   injuries,   hyperthyroidism   hypothyroidism,   uremia,
03300	pernicious   anemia,   cerebral  arteriosclerosis,  congestive  heart
03400	failure, malaria and epilepsy.      Also drug  intoxications  due  to
03500	alcohol,  amphetamines,  marihuana  and LSD can be accompanied by the
03600	paranoid mode. Thus the paranoid mode is not a disease but a  way  of
03700	processing  information,  a  resource,  which  accompanies underlying
03800	disorders. To account for the association of  paranoid  thought  with
03900	these  physical  states of illness, a psychological theorist might be
04000	tempted to hypothesize  that  an  intentionalistic  cognitive  system
04100	would  attempt  to  explain  a physical illness state by constructing
04200	persecutory beliefs  blaming  other  human  agents  for  causing  the
04300	ill-being of the disease state. But before making such an explanatory
04400	move, we must consider the elusive distinction  between  reasons  and
04500	causes in explanations of human behavior.
04600	
04700		When human action is to be explained, confusion easily arises
04800	between  appealing  to  reasons  and appealing to causes, as has been
04900	discussed in detail by Toulmin (1971). One view of the association of
05000	the  paranoid mode with physical disorders might be that the physical
05100	illness simply causes the paranoia ,through some  unknown  mechanism,
05200	at  a  "hardware"  level  beyond  the  influence of the procedures of
05300	mental processes and beyond  voluntary  self-control.  That  is,  the
05400	resultant  paranoid  process  represents  something that happens to a
05500	person as victim, not something that he  does  as  an  active  agent.
05600	Another  view  is that the paranoid mode can be explained in terms of
05700	reasons, justifications which  describe  an  agent's  intentions  and
05800	beliefs.   Does  a  person as an agent recognize, monitor and control
05900	what he is doing or trying to do? Or  does  it  just  happen  to  him
06000	automatically  without conscious deliberation? This question raises a
06100	third view, namely that unrecognized reasons, aspects of the  program
06200	which  are  sealed  off  and  inacessible  to  voluntary control, can
06300	function like causes.  Once brought to consciousness such reasons can
06400	be modified voluntarily by the agent, as a language user, reflexively
06500	talking to and instructing himself. This second-order monitoring  and
06600	control  through  language  contrasts  with  an  agent's inability to
06700	modify causes which lie beyond the influence  of  self-criticism  and
06800	change   through   internal  linguistically  mediated  argumentation.
06900	Timeworn  conundrums  about  concepts  of   free-will,   determinism,
07000	responsibility,  consciousness  and  the powers of mental action here
07100	plague us unless we stick closely to a computer analogy which makes a
07200	clear  and  useful  distinction  between  hardware,  interpreter  and
07300	programs.
07400	
07500		Each of these three views provides a serviceable  perspective
07600	depending  on how a disorder is to be explained and corrected.   When
07700	paranoid processes occur during amphetamine intoxication  they  might
07800	be viewed as biochemically caused and beyond the patient's ability to
07900	control volitionally through internal self-correcting dialogues  with
08000	himself.  When  a paranoid moment occurs in a normal person it can be
08100	viewed as having a reason or justification.  If the  paranoid  belief
08200	is  recognized as such, a person has the power to revise or reject it
08300	through internal  debate.  Between  these  extremes  of  drug-induced
08400	paranoid  processes  and the self-correctible paranoid moments of the
08500	normal  person,  lie  cases  of  paranoid   personalities,   paranoid
08600	reactions  and  the paranoid mode associated with the major psychoses
08700	(schizophrenic and manic-depressive).   One opinion has it  that  the
08800	major  psychoses  are  a consequence of unknown "hardware" causes and
08900	are beyond deliberate  voluntary  control.     But  what  are  we  to
09000	conclude about paranoid personalities and paranoid reactions where no
09100	hardware disorder is detectable or suspected?  Are such persons to be
09200	considered  patients  to  whom something is mechanically happening or
09300	are they agents whose behavior is a consequence of what they do?   Or
09400	are  they  both  agent  and patient depending on on how one views the
09500	self-modifiability of their symbolic processing?  In these  enigmatic
09600	cases  we  shall  take  the  position  that  in  normal, neurotic and
09700	psychotic paranoid processes (independent of the major psychoses) the
09800	paranoid  mode  represents  something  that  happens  to  a  man as a
09900	consequence of what he has undergone,of something  he  now  does  and
10000	something  he now undergoes.  Thus he is both agent and victim whose
10100	mental processes have powers to do and liabilities  to  undergo.  His
10200	liabilities are reflexive in that he is victim to and can succumb to,
10300	his own symbolic structures.
10400	
10500		From  this  standpoint  I  would  postulate a duality between
10600	reasons and causes. That is, just as in an algorithm a procedure  can
10700	serve  as  an  input  argument  to  another  procedure,  a reason can
10800	function as a cause in one context and as a justification in another.
10900	When  a  final cause, such as a consciously conceptualized intention,
11000	guides  efficient  causes  we  can   say   that   human   action   is
11100	non-determinate  since it is self-determinate. Thus the power to make
11200	some decisions freely and to change one's mind is non-illusory.  When
11300	a  reason  is  recognized to function as a cause and is accessible to
11400	self-monitoring, it may be changed by another procedure  which  takes
11500	it  as  an argument. In this sense a two-levelled system involving an
11600	interpreter and its programs is self- changeable and self-correcting,
11700	within limits.
11800	
11900		The major processes here postulated to  govern  the  paranoid
12000	mode  involve  an organization of symbol-processing procedures at one
12100	level governed by an interpreter at another level.  We  shall  sketch
12200	the operations of this organization briefly. First:
12300		(1) The interpreter executes a `consciencing' procedure which
12400	judges  an  action,  desire  or  state  of  the  self  to be wrong or
12500	defective according to criteria of sanctioning beliefs.  A  censuring
12600	process then attempts to assign blame to an agent for the wrong.
12700		(2)The  interpreter  attempts a simulation of assigning blame
12800	to the self.  If the self accepts blame, the trial simulation detects
12900	an  affect-signal  of  shame  warning  of  an  eventual undergoing of
13000	humiliation for personal failure or imperfection.  The  detection  in
13100	the  simulation  serves  as  an  anticipatory warning not to actually
13200	execute  this  procedure  since  it  will  result  in   the   painful
13300	re-experiencing of a negative affect-state of humiliation.
13400		(3)  An alternative procedure of assigning blame to others is
13500	next simulated and found not to eventuate in a painful  affect-state.
13600	Hence it is executed. It operates to repudiate that the  self  is  to
13700	blame  for a wrong and to ascribe blame to other human agents. Now it
13800	is not the self who is responsible for a wrong but  it  is  that  the
13900	self is wronged by others.  These strategies are inefficient and only
14000	partially effective as an escape since the outward conduct  generated
14100	result  in the self rpeatedly undergoing criticisms and condemnations
14200	from others which can lead to shame and humiliation. The locus of the
14300	censure  is  shifted from the self to others but the intended actions
14400	designed to contend with others have paradoxical repercussions  which
14500	result in what the self is internally trying to avoid.
14600	
14700		(4) Since others are now believed to have intentions to  wrong
14800	the  self,  procedures  for the detection of malevolence in the input
14900	from others, as individuals or as part of  a  conspiracy,  achieve  a
15000	first priority.
15100	
15200	
15300		(5) If the input procedures succeed in detecting malevolence,
15400	output strategies are executed in an attempt to  reduce  the  other's
15500	malevolent effects on the self.
15600		(6) An evaluation is made regarding  the  success  or
15700	failure of the output procedures.
15800		(7) If benevolence is detected in the input, an attempt is made
15900		    to tell one's story seeking self-affirmation from the other.
16000		(8) If the input is deemed neutral, a neutral nonparanoid  
16100		    response is given.
16200		The above description attempts to summarize in somewhat loose
16300	prose a complex series of postulated operations in an organization of
16400	symbol-processing procedures.    The details of these procedures  and
16500	their  interactions  will  be  made  explicit  when  the algorithm is
16600	described (see p ).
16700		The theory is further circumscribed in that  it  attempts  to
16800	explain  only  certain  phenomena  of a particular type of episode.It
16900	does not attempt to explain, for example, why the  censuring  process
17000	condemns  particular actions or states as wrongs nor how any of these
17100	procedures  develop  over  time   in   the   person's   socialization
17200	experience.    Thus it does not provide an ontogenetic explanation of
17300	how an organization of processes came to be the way it is.  The model
17400	offers  an  explanation  only of how the organization operates in the
17500	ethogenesis of conduct and character occuring in the present.
17600		Some evidence bearing on the postulated processes will now be
17700	discussed.   The  processes  of  (4),which  attempt  to  cope  with a
17800	malevolent other, receive evidential  support  from  observations  of
17900	normal,  neurotic  and psychotic paranoias.  The agent may report his
18000	self-monitoring directly to an  observer  commenting  that  his,  for
18100	example,  hostile  remarks  are  intended to retaliate for a believed
18200	wrong at the hands of the other. ("I want him  to  feel  bad  and  to
18300	leave  me  alone".)  The  output  actions of the paranoid mode can be
18400	grouped into reducing persecution by retribution  or  by  withdrawal.
18500	Retribution  is  intended  to  drive  the other away while withdrawal
18600	removes the self from the sphere of the other. We are  not  aware  of
18700	any experimental evidence bearing on this point. Perhaps the clinical
18800	and everyday observations are sufficient enough not to require any.
18900		The intensive scan for malevolence postulated in (3) has both
19000	clinical and experimental evidence in its  behalf.    Clinicians  are
19100	familiar  with  the  darting  eye-movements  of  psychotic paranoids.
19200	Patients themselves report their hypervigilance as intended to detect
19300	signs  of  malevolence.  Silverman [ ] and Venables [ ] have reported
19400	experiments indicating that paranoid schizophrenics more  extensively
19500	scan their visual fields and have a greater breadth of attention than
19600	other schizophrenic patients.
19700		In considering the  processes  postulated  in  (2)  and  (1),
19800	direct  evidence  is  hard  to come by and thus the postulates are on
19900	shakier ground. Since antiquity it has been a common observation that
20000	paranoids tend to accuse others of actions and states which hold true
20100	for themselves according an outside observer. As Newton, in a classic
20200	paranoid  clash,  said  about  Leibniz  300 years ago: "he himself is
20300	guilty of what he complains of in others"[  Manuel].   A  process  of
20400	ascription  has  also  been  offered  to  account  for the particular
20500	selectivity involved in the hypersensitivity to criticism.   That is,
20600	why  does a man believe others will ridicule him about his appearance
20700	unless some part of himself believes his appearance to be  defective.
20800	An  alternative  view  is  that  the selectivity stems from an agent,
20900	uncertain of himself and observing how others in  his  community  are
21000	censured and ridiculed, expects the same to be applied to him.
21100		The obscurity of the relation between what the  self  expects
21200	as  malevolence  and the self's own properties is well illustrated in
21300	hypotheses which have attempted to explain the  paranoid  mode  as  a
21400	consequence  of  homosexual  conflict. It has long been observed that
21500	some (not all) paranoid patients are excessively concerned  with  the
21600	topic  of  homosexuality.    Several studies of hospitalized paranoid
21700	schizophrenics show them to be  preoccupied  with  homosexuality  far
21800	more than the nonpsychotic controls.(See Klaf and Davis [ ],etc) Such
21900	evidence may be interpreted as  having  generative  implications  for
22000	certain cases. As a special case in a more general theory of avoiding
22100	humiliation, if homosexual interests are evaluated by  the  censuring
22200	process  as wrong, then the ethogenesis of the paranoid mode on these
22300	grounds becomes plausible. There is also a nonnegligible  probability
22400	that  an  agent,  doubtful  of  his own sexuality, might expect to be
22500	accused of homosexuality in a community which censures homosexuality.
22600	In  such  a  community  homosexuals trying to "pass" are of necessity
22700	suspicious  and  a  bit  paranoid  since  like  the  spy  in  hostile
22800	territory, they must be on guard against stigmatizing detection.
22900		It is obvious that self-censuring processes contribute to the
23000	regulation  of  human  conduct. But are distortions of self-censuring
23100	and blaming processes "really" the ethogenic  core  of  the  paranoid
23200	mode?  Heilbrun  and  Norbert have shown that paranoid schizophrenics
23300	are more sensitive to maternal censure as measured by the  disruption
23400	of  a  cognitive  task  by a tape-recording of a mother censuring her
23500	son.  [  ]  (Give  anecdotal  examples?  Spassky-Fischer,  Hofstader,
23600	Fowles, Corvo)
23700	.SS Initial Conditions
23800		When  a  theory  is  embodied  in a concrete operating model,
23900	representations  of  lawlike  generalizations   are   combined   with
24000	representations  of  singular  conditions,  usually  termed  "initial
24100	conditions".  In  constructing  a  simulation  one  can  attempt   to
24200	reproduce  the  behavior  of  an actual individual who is a member of
24300	some well-defined class. Another approach, which we  adopted,  is  to
24400	construct  a hypothetical individual whose behavior will cause him to
24500	be placed in a certain class, in this case the class "paranoid".  The
24600	singular statements describing our hypothetical individual follow.
24700		He is a 28 year old single Protestant male  who  works  as  a
24800	stockclerk at Sears, a large department store. He has no siblings and
24900	lives alone, seldom seeing his parents. He  is  sensitive  about  his
25000	parents,  his  religion  and  about  sex.  His  hobby  is gambling on
25100	horseracing, both at tracks and through bookies. A few months ago  he
25200	became  involved  in  a  severe  quarrel  with a bookie, claiming the
25300	bookie did not pay off a bet. After the quarrel it  occurred  to  him
25400	that  bookies  pay  protection to the underworld and that this bookie
25500	might gain revenge by having him injured or killed by the  Mafia.  He
25600	is eager to tell his story and to get help in protecting him from the
25700	underworld. He is willing to answer questions  about  non-  sensitive
25800	areas  of his life and offers hints about his delusional system in an
25900	attempt to feel out the interviewer's attitude towards him.